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Abstract
The status and position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”) in the United Nations
(“UN”) is a controversial issue which has elicited many comments and articles and has cast a long
shadow on the legality of the measures taken by the General Assembly (“GA”) and the Security
Council (“SC”) vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. In 1992, the SC and the GA both decided that the FRY,
composed of Serbia and Montenegro, could not participate in the work of the GA and its bodies.
The GA further extended the prohibition against Yugoslavian participation to the Economic and
Social Council and its bodies. Throughout each of these resolutions, the SC and the GA stated
that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY”) has ceased to exist and that the FRY
cannot automatically continue the membership of the former SFRY in the UN. At the root of the
unresolved status of the FRY in the UN is the question whether a succession or secession has taken
place in the former SFRY. Essentially, the status question had been created by the unilateral acts
of secession by the four former Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Macedonia) and the intrusion of the geo-strategic interests of foreign factors that encouraged,
made possible and rewarded these secessions by premature recognition of the new nations. Contin-
uous political pressure against the FRY is designed to bring about legal discontinuity of Yugoslavia
as a founding member of the Organization of the UN. The FRY continues to be precluded from
participating in the meetings of states that are parties to those treaties. Unfortunately, the U.S. ad-
ministration is not alone in erecting a new Berlin Wall on the FRY. The denial of the FRY’s right
to be a continuous member of the UN and other international organizations runs counter to the
contrary pronouncements issued by three out of the four former Yugoslav republics in the bilateral
agreements and a joint declaration on the normalization of relations with the FRY. The isolation
of the FRY from the UN work and other international organizations is only one of the absurdities
and frivolous abuses of international law that have been the hallmark of the involvement of the
international community in the Yugoslav crisis ever since its beginning.
Part I discusses the Security Council (SC) and General Assembly (GA) decisions that the FRY,
composed of Serbia and Montenegro, could not participate in the work of the GA and its bodies,
and the GA’s further extension of the prohibition against Yugoslavian’s participation in the Eco-
nomic and Social Council and its bodies. Part II addresses the root of the unresolved status of the
FRY in the UN, namely the question of whether a succession or secession had taken place in the
former SFRY. Part III asks whether the SFRY ceased to exist after unilateral acts of secession by
the four former Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia),
and the intrusion of the geo-strategic interests of foreign factors that encouraged, made possible,
and rewarded these secessions by premature recognition of the new nations. Part IV analyzes the
legal and political influences on the role of the FRY. Part V discusses the subsequent incorrect
treatment of the FRY. Finally, Part VI addresses the U.S. resistance to the FRY’s resumed role.
THE STATUS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC




The status and position of the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via ("FRY') in the United Nations ("UN") is a controversial issue
which has elicited many comments and articles and has cast a
long shadow on the legality of the measures taken by the Gen-
eral Assembly ("GA") and the Security Council ("SC") vis-a-vis
Yugoslavia.
I. SC & GA RESOLUTIONS
In 1992, the SC and the GA both decided that the FRY, com-
posed of Serbia and Montenegro, could not participate in the
work of the GA and its bodies.' The GA further extended the
prohibition against Yugoslavian participation to the Economic
and Social Council and its bodies.2
Throughout each of these resolutions, the SC and the GA
stated that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY')
has ceased to exist and that the FRY cannot automatically con-
tinue the membership of the former SFRY in the UN. The FRY
was requested to apply to become a member-State of the UN.
It is important to note that the notion of non-participation
in the work of the GA and the ECOSOC is not a category that is
envisaged by the UN Charter. The Charter foresees the possibil-
* Ambassador, Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the
United Nations.
1. See S.C. Res. 777, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3116th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
777 (1992); G.A. Res. 47/1, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/
47/474 (1992). Security Council Resolution 777 declares that the state formerly known
as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY) has ceased to exist and that the
claim by Serbia/Montenegro to continue automatically the membership of the former
SFRY in the United Nations ("UN") has not been generally accepted. As a result, Reso-
lution 777 concludes Serbia/Montenegro cannot continue automatically the member-
ship of the SFRY in the United Nations, and it recommends that the General Assembly
require Serbia/Montenegro to apply for membership.
2. G.A. Res. 48/252, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/47/
474 (1992).
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ity of expulsion and suspension from the UN, 3 neither of which
was used in the case of Yugoslavia. The SC followed its standard
decision making policy because the decision on Yugoslavia's
non-participation was a political compromise reached by the per-
manent members of the SC and contained within itself many
legal contradictions.
The Legal Counsel of the UN, commenting at the request
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, on the scope of Resolu-
tion 47/1,' declared that the resolution neither terminates nor
suspends Yugoslavia's membership in the UN Organization.5 Yu-
goslavia remains a member of the UN, its nameplate is present at
all meetings of the GA and its bodies, and the last flag of the
SFRY is still flown in front of the UN. The privileges and immu-
3. U.N. CHARTER art. 5 (stating that General Assembly ("GA") may suspend mem-
bership when recommended by Security Council); U.N. CHARTER art. 6 (discussing pro-
cedures and ability of UN to expel members).
4. Resolution 47/1 states in relevant part that
[t] he General Assembly, Having received the recommendation of the Security
Council of 19 September 1992 that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and
that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly ....
1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-
negro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and therefore decides
that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should ap-
ply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in
the work of the General Assembly.
G.A. Res. 47/1, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/47/474 (1992).
5. In a letter dated September 29, 1992, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations
stated that the "considered view of the United Nations Secretariat regarding the practi-
cal consequences of the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 47/1" was as
follows:
While the General Assembly has stated unequivocally that the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot automatically continue
the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the
United Nations and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations, the only practi-
cal consequence that the resolution draws is that the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of the Gen-
eral Assembly. It is clear, therefore, that representatives of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) can no longer participate in
the work of the General Assembly, its subsidiary organs, nor conferences and
meetings convened by it.
On the other hand, the resolution fieither terminates nor suspends Yugo-
slavia's membership in the Organization.
Letter from Carl-August Fleischhauer, UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs
and Legal Counsel, to Kenneth Dadzie, Under-Secretary-General, UN Conference on
Trade and Development, UN Doc. A/47/485, at 2 (1992).
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nities of the Mission and diplomats of Yugoslavia have been re-
tained, and the Secretariat of the UN regularly publishes docu-
ments that the Mission of the FRY produces.
In addition, the FRY is on all official lists of the member-
States of the UN and the Mission of the FRY is listed in the diplo-
matic handbook of Permanent Missions to the UN issued by the
UN Secretariat twice a year. The Secretariat has regularly ad-
dressed official requests to the FRY to fulfill its membership obli-
gations towards the budget of the UN and the expenditures on
peace-keeping operations since 1991, when the existence of the
SFRY was not contested. The Secretariat has regularly received
Yugoslavia's remittances and issued official certificates to that ef-
fect.
The main argument used to justify the SC and GA resolu-
tions' was that States which emerged after the break-up of the
former SFRY are new States and that, consequently, all of them
have to be recognized and that they have to apply for member-
ship to the UN.7 Although this was certainly true for the former
Yugoslav republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedo-
nia, and Slovenia), which seceded forcibly from the former SFRY
and clearly established themselves as new States, in the case of
the remaining part of the former SFRY, such an approach was
totally unjustified and unwarranted. This part of the former
SFRY never expressed an intention to leave or to become a new
State. On the contrary, it continued to honor, not only by its
Constitution of April 27, 1992 and laws, but also indeed, all inter-
national commitments assumed by the former SFRY. This cer-
tainly includes the membership in the UN and other interna-
tional organizations and agencies.
It is obvious that neither the SC nor the GA had a legal basis
for their decisions on the suspension of the activities of the FRY
from the work of the GA and the ECOSOC. Because these deci-
sions are political, they are legally controversial, both vis-A-vis the
6. S.C. Res. 777, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3116th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/777
(1992); G.A. Res. 47/1, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/47/474
(1992).
7. S.C. Res. 777, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3116th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/777
(1992); G.A. Res. 47/1, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/47/474
(1992); see Paul Lewis, U.N. Takes Step Toward Ousting Yugoslavia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1992 (noting that "federation of Serbia and Montenegro, which still calls itself Yugosla-
via, must reapply for United Nations membership as a new country, just as the republics
that emerged from the disintegration of Yugoslavia have already done.")
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Charter of the UN and vis-A-vis international law. Impartial in-
ternational legal experts noticed immediately the legal short-
comings and logical inconsistencies.8 The question whether the
SC and the GA, as branches of the UN, are competent to make
statements concerning the existence of a State has never been
answered.
II. SUCCESSION OR SECESSION?
At the root of the unresolved status of the FRY in the UN is
the question whether a succession or secession has taken place
in the former SFRY.
In the case of the former SFRY, the question turns on the
relationship of the members of the former Yugoslav federation
which unilaterally proclaimed their sovereignty and indepen-
dence vis-a-vis the international personality of Yugoslavia.9 Has
Yugoslavia's personality under international law been lost as a
8. Yehuda Z. Blum, UN Membership of the "New" Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 830, 832-33 (1992).
9. See Croatia and Slovenia Declared Their Independence From Yugoslavia, WALL ST. J.,
June 26, 1991, at Al (reporting Yugoslavia using army intervention as means to prevent
Croatia and Slovenia from declaring independence); Chuck Sudetic, Yugoslavia Breaks
Apart, 2 Rebel Republics Secede, INT'C HERALD TRIB., June 26, 1991, at 1 (stating that Croa-
tia and Slovenia had declared their independence from Yugoslavia). On June 24, 1991,
the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia adopted the Constitutional Act on the Sover-
eignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia which states, in pertinant part:
[t]he proposal for a bilateral disunion and initiation of discussion on new
forms of relations on the basis of a bilateral disunion and formation of sover-
eign States was not accepted within the reasonably allotted time, except by the
Republic of Croatia. The Republic of Slovenia was thus compelled to pass the
Constitutional Act.... The Republic of Slovenia as a sovereign and independ-
ent State hereby proclaimed: - that the Constitution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia is no longer in force on the territory of the Republic of
Slovenia.
Tanjug Focus SI/92, Jan. 14, 1992, at 93.
Article 4, para. 2, of the Constitutional Law on the Enforcement of the Constitutional
Act on the Autonomy and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia reads: "The com-
petences of the organs and organizations of the SFRY... shall in accordance with this
law be transferred to the organs and organizations of the Republic of Slovenia .. " Id.
at 101. It is obvious that the Assembly of Slovenia understood its Act of Independence
as an act of withdrawal from the Yugoslav Federation and not as an act causing the
disappearance of the Federation.
The Assembly of Croatia at the session of October 8, 1991 made the following
decision: "I. As of 8 October 1991, the Republic of Croatia severs the State-legal ties on
the basis of which, together with the other republics and provinces, it constituted the
hitherto SFRY. II. No bodies of the hitherto Federation - The SFRY - are considered
legitimate or legal in the Republic of Croatia ... ." Id. at 179.
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result of the acts of secession of some of its republics, or has it
continued to exist in spite of the changes which have occurred?
There is sufficient ground to claim that the FRY represents
the continuity of the former SFRY for the following reasons:
(1) Since the creation of the UN, there has been a strong
and consistent tendency for states from which a section or sec-
tions have seceded to retain their continuity under international
law, for example, India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh,
Egypt and Syria, and Ethiopia and Eritrea.
(2) The conclusion of the Badinter Arbitration Commis-
sion, 10 that the changes that took place in the SFRY can be quali-
fied as the dissolution of that state, is unfounded. It is clear that
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina seceded forcibly
from the SFRY, while in the case of Macedonia the separation
was peaceful. At the same time, the remaining loyal part of the
Federation, the republics of Serbia and Montenegro, constituted
themselves, after the secession of the four republics, under the
name of the FRY which made abundantly clear that it shall con-
tinue the international legal personality of the former SFRY.
(3) The FRY has continued to honor, not only by its procla-
mations but also in practice, all international obligations as-
sumed by the former SFRY, including those concerning the
membership in the UN and other international obligations.
(4) There is no rule of international law that prohibits the
FRY from continuing the international legal personality of the
former SFRY. The established rules of international law further
this proposition because the diminution of territory or of popu-
lation, changes in the constitutional order, or other internal
changes do not affect the international personality of a state.
(5) The FRY has continued to maintain diplomatic relations
with almost all States without entering into new agreements with
the States which previously maintained diplomatic relations with
the former SFRY.11
10. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions arising from
the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488 (1992); see Interntional Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia Documentyation on the Arbitration Commission under the UN/EC
(Geneva) Conference: Questions submitted to the Arbitration Commission and State-
ments relating to their submission, 32 I.L.M. 1579 (1993) (detailing proceedings before
Badinter Arbitration Commission).
11. The FRY maintains diplomatic relations with 170 countries. Eighty countries
have embassies in Belgrade, forty-three of them at the level of ambassador, three at the
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(6) Between April 27, 1992, when the FRY was constituted
on the part of the SFRY which remained after the unilateral se-
cession of the four federal units, and September 22, 1992, when
the GA adopted Resolution 47/1, the FRY exercised all the
rights of a member State and actively participated in the work of
the UN, including regular voting. This is borne out by the fact
that the FRY was tacitly accepted as a member State continuing
the international legal and political personality of the former
SFRY. If there had existed any valid historical, legal, moral, or
political reasons to contest it, it would have been done either
immediately or within the so-called first psychological second,
then certainly within the period of almost five months that
elapsed between the two aforementioned dates.
III. DID THE SFRY CEASE TO EXIST?
It is evident that Member states who raised questions regard-
ing the status of the FRY in the UN, and subsequently in other
international organizations, were motivated exclusively by polit-
ical reasons and interests. Nevertheless, the FRY status question
was only formally raised in the UN. Essentially, the status ques-
tion had been created by the unilateral acts of secession by the
four former Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Macedonia) and the intrusion of the geo-stra-
tegic interests of foreign factors that encouraged, made possible,
and rewarded these secessions by premature recognition of the
new nations. Attempts to dismember the SFRY initially were
made by way of the formula of the disassociation of the six fed-
eral republics on which the northern republics of Slovenia and
Croatia insisted. The aim of that formula was to invest the dis-
memberment of the SFRY with the semblance of free will so that
the states desiring to secede could neatly circumnavigate the se-
cession recognition reefs. Once that attempt foundered
through the refusal of Serbia and Montenegro, the republics
loyal to the SFRY, in order to abandon the common state, the
concept of the dissolution of the SFRY came to the fore.
The elaboration and explication of the concept was en-
trusted to the so-called Badinter Arbitration Commission, the ad-
level of charge d'affaires, nineteen at the level of charge d'affaires ad interim and one
at the level of gerent (Pakistan). The FRY has 100 embassies and consulates around the
world.
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visory body of the International Conference on Yugoslavia12
("Conference"), convened by the European Community ("EC"),
in The Hague on September 7, 1991. Although the Conference
was a result of the good offices of the EC and presented as a
common effort "to reestablish peace for all in Yugoslavia and to
achieve lasting solutions which respect all legitimate concerns
and legitimate aspirations,"13 it was quickly transformed into an
arbiter which took decisions and meted out punishments author-
itatively.
All four proposals of the Chairman of the Conference, Lord
Carrington, favored the four federal units that had expressed de-
sire to exit the SFRY and disfavored the two federal units that
had expressed full loyalty to the SFRY and opted to continue to
live in it. The first group was granted the right to become new
independent states and to be recognized by the EC once they
fulfilled certain conditions, whereas the other group was denied
the right to remain in the former federation. In other words,
the right to secede was recognized as a right more powerful than
the right to remain loyal to one's own State. Although they rep-
resented one half of the population of the SFRY and lived on a
large part of its territory, the Serbs and Montenegrins were re-
quested, according to the decree,14 to set up a new State and,
upon fulfilment of specific conditions, to request international
recognition. Lord Carrington was explicit: a common State of
Serbia and Montenegro may be called Yugoslavia again, but it
has to be a new State and may have nothing in common with the
former SFRY. The refusal of Serbia and Montenegro to aban-
don the SFRY was dubbed a lack of cooperation and was taken as
a pretext by the EC to impose economic sanctions on them on
December 2, 1991.1" Four days before punishing the loyalty to
the SFRY, on November 29, 1991 the "advisory" Arbitration
Commission made public its deadly Opinions on the SFRY. 6 In
a very simplified way and riding roughshod over a number of
12. The Badinter Arbitration Commission was assembled by the European Com-
munity to decide legal issues related to the Yugoslavian conflict to which its members
could not agree. Conference on Yugoslavia, supra note 10, at 1488.
13. Id. at 1521.
14. Id. at 1524-25.
15. Laura Silber, EC Lifts Yugoslav Sanctions, Excepts Serbia, Montenegro, WAsH. POST,
Dec. 3, 1991, at A9.
16. Conference on Yugoslavia, supra note 10, at 1488.
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important legal and political facts, the Opinions proceeded to
aver that "the SFRY is in the process of dissolution. ' 7 Seven
months later, on July 4, 1992, after the four seceding republics
had already been recognized by the EC and had become mem-
ber States of the UN, the Arbitration Commission officiated, at
the request of the Chairman of the International Conference on
Yugoslavia, the last rites for the SFRY in the form of its three last
Opinions: it established that the process of the dissolution of the
SFRY had come to an end and that the SFRY no longer existed,"s
that the membership of the SFRY in international organizations
should be terminated, 19 and that the FRY was a new State.2"
In order to reach these opinions, it was necessary to turn a
blind eye to the resolve of the Serbs and Montenegrins to re-
main in Yugoslavia as their common State and to deny them the
right to self-determination which was granted to Slovenes,
Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Macedonians. It also was neces-
sary to deny the representation and legitimacy to federal organs.
This was accomplished through the synchronized withdrawals of
the representatives of the four seceding republics from the high-
est organs of the Federation. The aim of reducing the SFRY to
the so-called rump Yugoslavia was to provide force to the argu-
ment that the organs of the Federation had ceased to function,
which led to the conclusion that the State of the SFRY had
ceased to exist. 2' Even if that argument was true, it would still be
17. Id. at 1497.
18. Id. at 1521 ("[alddressing the question of whether dissolution of the SFRY was
complete, the Commission replied that the dissolution was complete and that the SFRY
no longer exists.").
19. Id. at 1525 (stating that "the SFRY's membership of international organizations
must be terminated according to their statutes and that none of the successor states
may therenpon claim for itself alone the membership rights previously enjoyed by the
former SFRY ... ").
20. Id. at 1526 (noting that "the opinion of the Arbitration Commission is that: the
FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is a new state which cannot be considered the sole suc-
cessor to the SFRY ....").
21. In Opinion No. 8, the Arbitration Commission decided that
the existence of a federal state, which is made up of a number of separate
entities, is seriously compromised when a majority of these entities, embracing
a greater part of the territory and population, constitute themselves as sover-
eign states with the result that federal authority may no longer be effectively
exercised.... the common federal bodies on which all the Yugoslav republics
were represented no longer exist: no body of that type has functioned since
!d. at 1522-23. However, the view expressed in this Opinion does not accurately reflect
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very difficult to explain why the collapse of State authority in
Afghanistan, Albania, or Somalia for instance, did not lead to
the disappearance of those States.
IV. LEGAL AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON ROLE OF
THE FRY
The GA resolution of September 22, 1992 was adopted at
the recommendation of the SC without the invocation of the
Main Committee. Also, the text of Resolution 9522 was trans-
ferred almost ad literam from the recommendation of the SC. As
already stated, neither the recommendation of the SC nor the
resolution of the GA are based on any Article of the Charter of
the UN. Before they were made and adopted, no international
organization questioned the status of the FRY which, by adopt-
ing the Constitution and Declaration of April 27, 1992,23 pro-
claimed that it represented the member State continuity in the
SFRY, the international legal personality of the SFRY, and that it
recognized and accepted all the international agreements and
obligations of the SFRY.
It is clear that neither the SC nor the GA had legal grounds
for their decisions. The Charter of the UN provides only for ex-
pulsion from, and suspension of, membership. 24 The Charter of
the UN does not provide for the suspension of participation in
the work of the UN. It is obvious that both the SC and the GA
could not decide to exclude the FRY from UN membership on
the basis of Article 6 of the Charter of the UN. 25 In order to
bring such a decision, the SC and the GA first would have had to
recognize the continuity between the SFRY and the FRY for a
the facts relevant either in the case of the former SFRY or in the case of other similar
instances. The Yugoslav federal state consisting of six federal units and reduced to two
federal units did not cease to exist because of the secession of its four federal units.
After all, Yugoslavia existed also as a unitary state for the first 23 years of its existence.
Thus, a transformation of a unitary state into a federation or vice versa does not affect
the international personality of that State.
22. G.A. Res. 95/1, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. (1946).
23. U.N. ScoR, 47th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/23877 (1992).
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 5 (providing authority to suspend membership in UN when
recommended by Security); U.N. CHARTER art. 6 (providing authority to expel members
from UN).
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 6. Article 6 of the UN Charter states that "[a] Member of
the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the pres-
ent Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the
erecommendation of the Security Council." Id.
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non-existent state cannot be excluded from UN membership.
For the same reasons, the SC and the GA could not bring a deci-
sion on suspending the membership of the FRY from the UN on
the basis of Article 5 of the Charter of the UN because it would
have amounted to the recognition of the continuity of the SFRY
and the FRY.26 The position taken by the Secretariat of the UN
immediately after the adoption of GA Resolution 47/1, in which
it is said that it "neither terminates nor suspends Yugoslavia's
membership in the Organization" 27 and that its practical conse-
quence was that the representatives of the FRY can no longer
participate in the work of the GA, its subsidiary organs, nor con-
ferences or meetings convened by it, is therefore very logical. 21
Because it was impossible to remove the FRY from the world Or-
ganization under any Article of the Charter of the UN, recourse
was left to political pressure in an attempt to compel the FRY to
do it itself and then to apply for admission, but as a new State.
General Assembly Resolution 47/1 created a basis for that un-
dertaking by its provision stating that the FRY cannot continue
automatically the membership of the former SFRY and that the
SFRY should apply for membership in the UN. Thus, what can-
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 5. Article 5 of the UN Charter states that
[a] Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement
action has been taken by the Sceurity Council may be suspended from the
exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Security Council . The exercise of these
rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.
Id.
27. Letter from Carl-August Fleischhauer, UN Under Secretary-General for Legal
Affairs and Legal Counsel, to Mario Nobilo, Permanent Representative of the Republic
of Croatia to the United Nations, UN Doc. A/47/485 (1992). The letter states in perti-
nant part that
General Assembly resolution 47/1 deals with a membership issue which is not
foreseen in the Charter of the United Nations, namely, the consequences for
purposes of membership in the United Nations of the disintegration of a
member State on which there is no agreement among the immediate suc-
cesors of that State or among the membership of the Organization at large....
[T]he resolution neither terminates nor suspends Yugoslavia's membership
in the Organization. Consequently, the seat and nameplate remain as
before.... At Headquarters, the Secretariat will continue to fly the flag of the
old Yugoslavia .... The resolution does not take away the right of Yugoslavia
to participate in the work of the organs other than Assembly bodies. The ad-
mission to the United Nations of a new Yugoslavia [Serbia-Montenegro] under
Article 4 of the Charter will terminate the situation created by resolution 47/1.
Id.
28. Id.
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not be done by the GA of the UN, can, should, and must be
done by the FRY itself: renounce its membership in the UN; pro-
claim itself a new state; and submit an application for admission
into the membership of the UN. In hindsight, one can notice
that such an unprincipled position vis-a-vis the FRY has been
much in evidence in the unprincipled policy of some foreign
political factors towards the continued existence of the former
SFRY since the outset and throughout the unfolding of the Yugo-
slav crisis. Continuous political pressure against the FRY is
designed to bring about legal discontinuity of Yugoslavia as a
founding member of the Organization of the UN.
V. INCORRECT TREATMENT OF THE FRY
Although GA resolution 47/1 is silent on multinational trea-
ties, the overbearing political pressure was quickly transferred
and expanded to include all multilateral treaties as well, includ-
ing those concluded after September 22, 1992 and to which the
FRY acceded after that date. The FRY continues to be precluded
from participating in the meetings of states that are parties to
those treaties. This exclusion is continuing even though the Sec-
retariat of the UN took the position that resolution 47/1 "did
not address the question of the status of Yugoslavia as party to
multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General ' 29 al-
ready at the time when the status of the FRY began to be dis-
puted. It went on to say that "the Depository continues to accept
treaty actions taken by Yugoslavia"3 and to list them cumula-
tively in the publication of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with
the Secretary-General without differentiating between those
taken by the SFRY and those taken by the FRY. The pinnacle of
legal inconsistency and arrogant arbitrariness is the insistence by
some states that are parties to the treaties that the FRY must ful-
fill its obligations, including those made in its absence and with-
out its consultation, even though the FRY is precluded from ex-
ercising its rights. The principle of free will in acceding to inter-
national treaties and the principle of equality in the treatment of
their parties have been inexplicably brushed aside.
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VI. U.S. RESISTANCE TO THE FRY'S RESUMED ROLE
The conclusion of the peace accords in Dayton, Ohio,31
which put an end to the civil and fratricidal war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, eliminated the reasons for maintaining the UN
sanctions against the FRY, including its isolation from the inter-
national community. Considering the FRY's key contributions to
the success of the Dayton Accord, it was only logical to expect
that all retribution measures taken against the FRY during the
conflict would be discontinued. The lifting of those measures is
required by the interests of the strengthening of peace and sta-
bility and the encouragement of economic development in the
Balkans.
Unfortunately, this did not come to pass. Following certain
delay, the SC eventually lifted all economic and trade sanctions
against the FRY.32 Contrary to the general trend, however, the
United States decided to maintain the so-called outer wall of
sanctions. This was a bad omen and an indication that Yugosla-
via's road back to international life was not going to be smooth.
Proceeding from the important positive developments that had
taken place in the Yugoslav crisis and the major contribution of
the FRY to the crisis' resolution, the International Contact
Group for Bosnia and Herzegovina, consisting of France, Ger-
many, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, and the United States, was of
the opinion, with the exception of the United States, that the SC
should be recommended to enable the FRY to resume its regular
activities in the work of the GA and the ECOSOC. Yet, due to
the negative position of the United States, that useful initiative
was not carried through.
The U.S. position is difficult to understand because they did
agree that the FRY should figure under its full official name in
the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, as well as in the SC resolution on the lifting of all sanc-
tions against Yugoslavia. The Dayton peace accords put an end
to the tragic war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, yet it failed to do
,away with the outdated policy of retribution against the FRY in
'. 31. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina With An-
nexes, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) [hereinafter GFA]. The GFA was negotiated
at the Dayton Peace Accords in Dayton, Ohio and signed in Paris, France in December
of 1995.
32. S.C. Res. 1074, U.N. SCOR, 3700th mtg. (1996).
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the form of the so-called outer wall of sanctions and the defer-
ment of the normalization of its status in international organiza-
tions. In light of Yugoslavia's full cooperation in the peace pro-
cess, such a policy is not only unnecessary and unjust, but also is
contrary to the declared goals of the international community of
achieving a speedy and lasting stabilization of the region. It is
unlikely that the international community will achieve that wor-
thy goal any time soon if the FRY, the country in the geographi-
cal and strategic center of the Balkans, is sapped economically
and weakened politically. SECI, the U.S. initiative aimed at
strengthening economic cooperation in the Balkans based on
the private sector, will remain hobbled if the United States con-
tinues to insist that the FRY be kept out of the process of negotia-
tion and agreement making. After all, poverty and social ten-
sion, to which Yugoslavia is doomed unless the outer wall of
sanctions is removed and its status in international financial in-
stitutions, primarily in the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, is regulated, have never before been a fertile soil in
which to plant the seeds of democracy and to carry out the pro-
cess of privatization. Modern history has no memory of
destabilization ever bringing about stabilization.
Unfortunately, the U.S. administration is not alone in erect-
ing a new Berlin Wall on the FRY. It is supported by some mili-
tant and neighboring Islamic countries which have found their
own, not readily detectable interests in the Yugoslav crisis. Their
bandwagon is joined by the four former Yugoslav republics, the
original secessionist sin of which is a perennial source of their
opposition towards the FRY.
VII. FRY'S EXCLUSION FROM THE UN IN LIGHT OF
RECENT EVENTS
The denial of the FRY's right to be a continuous member of
the UN and other international organizations runs counter to
the contrary pronouncements issued by three out of the four for-
mer Yugoslav republics in the bilateral agreements and a joint
declaration on the normalization of relations with the FRY.
Article 4 of the Agreement on the regulation of relations
and the promotion of cooperation between the FRY and the Re-
public of Macedonia, concluded in Belgrade on April 8, 1996
states, inter alia:
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In the light of the fact that Serbia and Montenegro had ex-
isted as independent States before the creation of Yugoslavia,
and in view of the fact that Yugoslavia continued the interna-
tional legal personality of these States, the Republic of Mace-
donia respects the state continuity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.33
Article 5 of the Agreement on the normalization of rela-
tions between the FRY and the Republic of Croatia, concluded
in Belgrade on August 23, 1996 states, inter alia:
Proceeding from the historical fact that Serbia and Montene-
gro existed as independent States before the creation of Yu-
goslavia, and bearing in mind the fact that Yugoslavia has con-
tinued the international legal personality of these States, the
Republic of Croatia notes the existence of the State con-
tinuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
34
In paragraph IV of the Joint Declaration signed by Presi-
dents Slobodan Milosevic and Alija Izetbegovic in Paris on Octo-
ber, 3 1996, it is stated, inter alia, that "Bosnia and Herzegovina
accepts the State continuity of the FRY."35
VIII. UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF FORMER SFRY REPUBLICS
The isolation of the FRY from the UN work and other inter-
national organizations is only one of the absurdities and frivo-
lous abuses of international law that have been the hallmark of
the involvement of the international community in the Yugoslav
crisis ever since its beginning. The internal administrative divi-
sions among the republics of the SFRY have been made into in-
ternational borders, whereas the internationally recognized bor-
ders of the SFRY, solemnly guaranteed by the 1975 Helsinki Fi-
nal Act," were forcibly torn apart and sacrificed. The right to
self-determination, granted to peoples by the UN Charter 7 and
33. Macedonia-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Communique and Agreement on
the Regulation of Relations and Promotion of Cooperation, UN Document S/1996/
291, Annex (1996).
34. Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, UN Document A/51/318 S/1996/706, Annex
(1996).
35. Lynn Terry, Bosnia, Serbia Sign Diplomatic Pact, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1996, at
A2.
36. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Aug. 1,
1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
37. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(2), 55.
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the Helsinki Final Act,38 were recognized by the Badinter Arbi-
tration Commission and the EC to former Yugoslav republics
alone, whereby the autochthonous Serbian people living in re-
publics other than Serbia were deprived of their inalienable
right to self-determination. The right to secession was recog-
nized as stronger than the right to remain loyal to the Federa-
tion. Such double standards abounded, especially during the
years of the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. More
often than not, they were aided and abetted by an unprece-
dented demonization of one people and one side in the civil war
by some influential media and political factors.
Particularly absurd is the fact that the four seceding repub-
lics, two of which (Slovenia and Macedonia) have no State tradi-
tion at all, while the other two (Croatia and Bosnia and Herzego-
vina) have no modem State traditions, became UN member
States. Serbia and Montenegro, on the other hand, the constitu-
ent units of the present-day Yugoslavia with long historical39 and
modern State traditions and recognized subjects of international
law even before the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918, are artificially
kept outside the activities of international organizations and
outside multilateral treaties.
In practical terms, the list of conditions the United States
and the European Union expect the FRY to fulfill in order to be
re-integrated into international organizations and financial insti-
tutions4 ° is open-ended and is being constantly extended. Fur-
ther, some of these conditions could well be set to a large
38. Helsinki Final Act, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
39. It would be problematic, therefore, to talk of national states at any point in the
thirteenth century. But, if national identities were judged to be developing effectively
in any place at the time, it could only have been in some of the small countries who had
successfully segregated themselves from their neighbors. Portugal was a candidate for
this, as was Denmark, and, in the Balkans, Serbia, and Bulgaria. Both Serbia and Bulga-
ria had re-established their independence, from Byzantium in the 1180s. More impor-
tanty, they had both created their own national Orthodox Churches with their own
patriarchs-Serbia in 1219, Bulgaria in 1235. This step gave them a powerful instru-
ment for forging a separate identity, for educating national elite, for political publicity,
and for the sanctification of national institutions. It was a step that none of the coun-
tries of Latin Christendom could take until the Reformation and which Muscovite Rus-
sia did not take until 1589. It strengthened the bonds of these two Slav peoples whose
cohesion would be tested through 500 years of Ottoman rule. NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE,
A HISTORY 380-81 (1996).
40. This list includes requests to the Yugoslav side to see to it that progress be
made in the solution of the problems in Kosovo and Metolija; to implement the Day-
ton peace accords; extradite persons indicted for war crimes; take measures to stabilize
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number of other countries as well. Yet, they are not being set,
and they are not likely to be set.
The political vendetta against the FRY does not facilitate
peace, stability, and development in the region. Incorporated in
the system of international relations and activities, the FRY
would be a much more useful vehicle for achieving these goals.
The realities of the region, substantially different from those that
prevailed during the war period of the Yugoslav crisis, and the
irreplaceable and positive role of the FRY demand that an end
be put to confrontation and that it be substituted by uncondi-
tional cooperation. This, all the more so, as the FRY has long
expressed readiness to actively engage in the existing structures
and organizations of the international community. Yugoslavia's
continued isolation from the activities of the UN and other in-
ternational organizations is therefore anachronistic and absurd
and, alongside the continued pressure and setting of conditions,
shackles positive developments both in Yugoslavia and the re-
gion.
A series of developments that took place during the un-
folding of the Yugoslav crisis, as well as the current need and
interest of the international community to have the on-going
peace process evolve into general normalization, should be
taken into account in solving the status of the FRY in the UN.
That solution can and should be a pragmatic compromise. It is
indisputable that Serbia and Montenegro have lived continu-
ously in the common State of Yugoslavia since 1918, when they
built in their own State continuity and international legal and
political personality. It is also indisputable that the four former
Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Macedonia) segregated themselves in 1991 from the com-
mon state, and that in 1992 they became internationally recog-
nized independent states. These two facts do not affect the equal
rights of the four former Yugoslav republics and the recon-
figured FRY regarding the division of the assets and liabilities of
the SFRY.
CONCLUSION
A practical way out of the current impasse is to be found in
internal democracy; and commit itself to completing the negotiations on succession
issues.
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the formula of the Contact Group, 41 postulated immediately af-
ter the signing of the Dayton peace accords. It takes into ac-
count the radically changed situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Yugoslav crisis, takes note of the key contribution of the
FRY to the successful conclusion of the accords, and points to
the overall benefits of the closure of the Yugoslav crisis and the
removal of its consequences. The politicized question of the
membership of the FRY in the UN will be overcome by way of
making practical arrangements to enable the FRY to resume its
activities in the GA and other bodies of the UN that it carried
out for almost five months before September 22, 1992 on a regu-
lar basis.
Such a generally beneficial outcome would be much easier
to achieve if all interested parties proceeded from certain as-
sumptions, even though they might not quite conform with their
current approach.
The former Yugoslav republics could tacitly accept that the
former SFRY has never disintegrated in the part making up the
present FRY, and that it has continued to exist in the form of the
present FRY. Considering that Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia
and Herzegovina have already made such a concession in their
bilateral agreements with the FRY on normalization of mutual
relations, this would not be a new concession for them.
In return, the FRY could tacitly admit that the creation of
new independent states out of the four former Yugoslav repub-
lics was also a consequence of the non-functioning of the SFRY
in the territories of these republics.
On that basis, the European Union could tacitly abandon its
position from 1991-92 on the complete dissolution of the SFRY,
whereby it would de facto distance itself from the arbitrary Opin-
ions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission.
On the basis of these compromises, the SC could recom-
mend to the GA that it should adopt a resolution, or decide
otherwise, to enable the FRY to resume its regular activities in
the GA and in other bodies of the UN system.
This solution would rid the UN of a cumbersome anachro-
nism and would not harm any state's interest. Yugoslavia's full
41. In May of 1994, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States formed the Contact Group. The Search for Peace in the Balkans: A Primer,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1995, at All.
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incorporation into international political and financial life
would have a very positive effect on the peace process and the
overall stabilization of the situation in the region, while the
universality of the UN and the noble goals of achieving global
peace and cooperation would be re-affirmed in a concrete and
effective way.
